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ABSTRACT. Scholars of comanagement are faced with a difficult methodological challenge. As comanagement has evolved and
diversified it has increasingly merged with the field of adaptive management and related concepts that derive from resilience thinking
and complex adaptive systems theory. In addition to earlier considerations of power sharing, institution building, and trust, the adaptive
turn in comanagement has brought attention to the process of social learning and a focus on concepts such as scale, self-organization,
and system trajectory. At the same time, a number of scholars are calling for a more integrated approach to studying (adaptive)
comanagement that is able to situate these normative concepts within a critical understanding of how context and power fundamentally
influences the behavior of a system. We propose that the “politicized” version of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
Framework, originally developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues, is well suited to addressing this challenge. The framework
provides breadth, clarity, and structure by drawing the analyst’s attention to the range of variables and questions to be considered when
attempting a study of comanagement, the various components of the situation, and the ways in which they interact, and the criteria
the analyst may wish to adopt in evaluating the outcomes of the process. Alongside its ability to address contextual factors and power
dynamics, the socioeconomic and institutional dimension of the politicized IAD Framework means that it can be used to conduct
analyses that result in sound policy recommendations.
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INTRODUCTION
Many of the world’s habitats and ecosystems are failing because
of human activity and many more are under threat and face an
uncertain future; yet at the same time a growing global population
and changing lifestyle preferences are only set to exacerbate these
issues in the coming years (UNEP 2012). A tremendous amount
of work has concerned itself  with potential solutions to the
difficult problems associated with ecosystem loss and natural
resource management, attracting the attention of scholars
working within and across different disciplines. Among
academics and practitioners there is a growing appreciation of
the shortfalls associated with a one-size-fits-all approach to
environmental governance (Meinzen-Dick 2007, Ostrom 2007)
and an awareness that centralized and bureaucratic attempts to
manage the environment tend to be exclusionary, reactive,
insensitive to changing circumstances, and prone to result in
pathological outcomes (Holling and Meffet 1996, Glasbergen
1998, Pahl-Wostl 2007, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007). In the place of
top-down governance a suite of institutional arrangements have
emerged as viable alternatives in particular circumstances,
ranging from markets in natural resources to community-based
systems of management (de Loë et al. 2009). One approach that
links centralized and decentralized forms of governance across
scales of organization and is gaining increasing attention as a
means of addressing these challenges is comanagement.  
Comanagement has its roots in the work of commons scholars
(Kearney 1984, McCay and Acheson 1987, Pinkerton 1989a),
although in the last decade it has increasingly merged with the
field of adaptive management and related concepts found in
resilience thinking and complex adaptive systems theory (Holling
1978, Lee 1993, Levin 1999, Folke 2006). This merger has tended
to combine the linkages typical of comanagement with the
learning dimension associated with adaptive management,
resulting in what has been termed “adaptive comanagement”
(Olsson et al. 2004a, Armitage et al. 2007, 2009). The cross-
disciplinary nature of (adaptive) comanagement demands a wide
methodological breadth that is able to encompass concepts and
approaches deriving from both the natural and the social sciences.
Thus a challenge for comanagement scholars relates to the need
to develop a common framework that is capable of addressing
the many dimensions of comanagement across differing physical
and social settings, and to ground the normative concepts
associated with the subject in a critical awareness of how context
fundamentally influences process and outcomes.  
We discuss how a version of the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) Framework, originally developed by Ostrom
and her colleagues (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, Ostrom 1990, 2005,
2010) but that has been adapted by Clement (2010) to explicitly
consider important contextual variables, can be used to analyze
comanagement. To do this we briefly review comanagement and
the developments it has undergone since its establishment as a
concept in the 1980s, as well as the methodological challenges
associated with the study of the subject. We provide an overview
of the “politicized” IAD Framework as proposed by Clement,
before discussing how this framework is well suited to analyses of
comanagement. We conclude with a synopsis of the main points
of the discussion.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMANAGEMENT THEORY
Emerging as a branch of commons theory, comanagement has
come to be seen by some as a fourth ideal form of property-rights
regime alongside the government, market, and community
(Imperial and Yandle 2005). At the same time, “co-management
is not envisioned as a replacement for central government, nor is
it incompatible with existing market-based systems; it is a
supplement to these decision-making processes” (Plummer and
Fitzgibbon 2004:63). Despite its common point of origin in the
academic literature, the concept of comanagement has since been
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influenced by a diverse group of scholars, managers, and
commentators, resulting in variegated explanations of the term
as one moves from place to place, resource to resource, or between
different junctures in time. Nonetheless, rather than contradicting
themselves, these conceptions of comanagement instead serve to
highlight the multifaceted nature of the subject, as well as the
conceptual developments that have occurred as new insights have
emerged, different analytical approaches have been adopted, and
previously separate fields of enquiry have come together.  
One way of interpreting these various conceptions of
comanagement has been provided by Berkes (2009), who charts
the development of the term from its initial focus on structural
dimensions through to an appreciation of complexity and the
need to give precedence to function and process. From this
perspective, early attempts at analyzing comanagement tended to
focus on formal power-sharing arrangements between a
community of resource users and a central government (Berkes
et al. 1991), the development of adequate levels of trust between
participants (Pinkerton 1989b, Daniels and Walker 1996, Ostrom
1999a, Leach and Pelkey 2001), and institution building both at
the local level and between levels of organization (Jentoft 1989,
Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Increasingly, however, consideration
was given to the temporal dimension of comanagement and “how
different management tasks are organized and distributed,
concentrating on the function, rather than the structure, of the
system” (Carlsson and Berkes 2005:73).  
This change in focus has turned attention toward the mechanisms
through which the process of comanagement proceeds. Here
scholars have found fertile ground in merging the narratives of
comanagement and adaptive management, where the former’s
attention to system linkages complements the latter’s concern with
problem solving and learning-by-doing. The merger of these two
fields, each with their own distinct disciplinary histories, has
resulted in what has come to be called adaptive comanagement
(Olsson et al. 2004a, Armitage et al. 2007, 2009). This
development has propelled comanagement into the realm of
complex adaptive systems theory and resilience thinking, in which
concepts such as scale, self-organization, and emergence have
established themselves in the discourse (Levin 1999, Olsson et al.
2004b, Folke 2006). It has also placed a strong focus on the concept
of social learning as a means by which the multiple perspectives
represented in a system of comanagement are to jointly learn
about and adapt to change and uncertainty (Armitage et al. 2008). 
The adaptive turn has also brought attention to earlier depictions
that portrayed comanagement as a binary relationship between
a homogenous community of resource users and a monolithic
government. It is recognized that neither the government, nor a
community of resource users are simple entities acting in unison
but instead can themselves be thought of as complex systems
comprising networks of individuals and groups. In an attempt to
elucidate this perspective, Carlsson and Berkes (2005) have put
forward the idea of “comanagement as governance,” whereby the
system of management can be described in terms of the networks
and institutions that emerge as a result of the process of
collaboration. This version of comanagement “encompasses the
idea that in many real-life cases, we can expect to find rich webs
of relations and agreements linking different parts of the public
sector to a similarly heterogeneous set of private actors, all within
the same area or within the same resource system” (Carlsson and
Berkes 2005:69).
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The above short synopsis shows how comanagement can be
thought of in terms of power sharing, trust building, institution
building, process, problem solving, social learning, and as
governance (Berkes 2007, 2009, Plummer and Armitage 2007a).
All aspects of comanagement are valid and convey important
messages. Furthermore, for analytical purposes it is helpful to
distinguish between the various ways in which comanagement can
be understood, but in reality the boundaries of these categories
are permeable, allowing each to flow into the other. However, the
“many faces” of comanagement (Berkes 2007) provides a
methodological challenge to those attempting to study it. The
cross-disciplinary nature of the subject permits scope for
investigating comanagement according to the tenets of a range
of distinct and sometimes seemingly incompatible scholarly
lineages. The adaptive turn in comanagement has brought in
concepts and perspectives that stem from the natural sciences,
whereas the large social and institutional component of the
subject, in which issues of power, collaboration, and conflict
abound, plants comanagement firmly in the social sciences, with
their diverse philosophical and methodological underpinnings.  
Broadly speaking, a great deal of research aimed at understanding
comanagement has tended to focus on and contribute toward the
normative concepts that have come to characterize the field. These
studies have been invaluable in developing a general relational
picture of comanagement and for theory building. On the other
hand, far fewer studies have adopted a more critical stance. Those
that have demonstrate the importance of taking into account case-
specific histories and the role of power when attempting to
understand situations that are significantly less technical than
many analyses of commons governance might lead one to believe
(Li 2006). However, despite the large and growing body of
literature on the subject, Carlsson and Berkes (2005:72) observe
that “our tools for conceptualizing and analyzing co-management
are strikingly blunt.”  
Armitage (2008) has argued for a more inclusive approach that is
capable of incorporating the normative concepts associated with
governance arrangements such as (adaptive) comanagement
within a framework that grounds them in the contextual details
of a specific case. To this end, he suggests a fruitful synthesis could
see commons and resilience discourses merge with concepts,
methods, and approaches found in political ecology, including
analyses of history, discourse, and the political economy. Wilson
(2010) points out that when it comes to discussions of social
resilience a tension often exists between systematic approaches
that proceed upon normative lines, and more critical attempts
that fail to achieve the same systematic rigor: “when [resilience]
discussions are systematic they tend not to be critical, and when
they are critical they fail to be systematic” (Wilson 2010:52).
Similarly then, Wilson posits that it would be beneficial to
combine resilience thinking with approaches developed in critical
social theory and that are employed by those working within
political ecology.  
The challenge then is the development or adoption of a
framework that is general and flexible enough to encompass the
methodological diversity required to investigate the various
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dimensions of comanagement from both a normative and critical
perspective, and detailed enough to ensure a systematic and
structured analysis. Articulating this goal, Plummer and
Armitage (2007a:841) state that “to further build and consolidate
the theoretical foundations of co-management, it will be
necessary to pursue methodologically consistent avenues of
research across geographical locations and resource contexts.
Systematic evaluation of experience grounded in commonly
framed approaches will play a key role in this regard.” We
demonstrate how the politicized IAD Framework can be used to
address this challenge.
THE POLITICIZED IAD FRAMEWORK
We provide an overview of the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) Framework, a key tool for scholars interested
in how diverse governance systems affect people’s ability to solve
problems, as well as the modifications Clement (2010) has made
to the framework in bringing explicit attention to the role of the
political economy, discourse, and power in studies of natural
resource management. We keep our discussion of the original
IAD Framework to a minimum, and instead refer the reader to
the many good summaries and expositions to be found in the
literature (see for example Kiser and Ostrom 1982, Ostrom 1990,
2005, 2011, Ostrom et al. 1994, Blomquist and DeLeon 2011,
McGinnis 2011).
The IAD framework
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework
provides a means for inquiring into a subject by bringing explicit
attention to the relevant variables and the questions one may want
to ask (Blomquist and DeLeon 2011). At the heart of the
framework is an “action arena,” consisting of an “action
situation,” which is the social space where individuals or groups
of individuals interact and outcomes are produced, and the
“actor,” which contains the theory of the individual that the
analyst wishes to draw upon. Behavior of participants in the
action situation is influenced by three sets of exogenous variables:
the biophysical and material world, the community, and the rules-
in-use (Fig. 1). According to McGinnis (2011:172), these variables
“encompass all aspects of the social, cultural, institutional, and
physical environment that set the context within which an action
arena is situated.” 
The action situation can be further broken down into seven
working components (Fig. 2) consisting of participants who take
up various positions, where any given position allows the
participant to undertake certain actions that are dependent on
how much information they possess about each available action,
how actions are linked to potential outcomes, the degree of
control individuals exercise over these outcomes, and the costs
and benefits they assign to them (Ostrom 1990). McGinnis
(2011:173) observes that these working components of an action
situation serve to “specify the nature of the relevant actors as well
as the resources and options they face.” The three exogenous
variables are able to affect different parts of the action situation
(Ostrom 2005). Furthermore, a key feature of the IAD
Framework relates to its ability to analyze behavior at multiple
theoretical levels by shifting from one action situation to deeper
rule-changing situations (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). Three nested
levels are commonly recognized: the operational, collective-
choice, and constitutional choice (Fig. 3). One of the main
strengths of the IAD Framework lies in its ability to provide a
structured and consistent approach to analyzing complex
phenomena. It also recognizes the interdependency of the three
exogenous variables. For example, the relevance of any set of rules-
in-use depends strongly on the prevailing biophysical conditions
and the shared norms and values of those for whom the rules are
intended.
Fig. 1. The IAD Framework. Adapted from Ostrom (2005).
Fig. 2. The action situation of the IAD Framework. Adapted
from Ostrom (2005).
The IAD Framework is compatible with a range of criteria that
can be used to evaluate the process and outcomes related to the
institutional arrangement under consideration. Ostrom (2005) lists
as examples of criteria that are suitable for examining the overall
performance of an institutional arrangement, (1) economic
efficiency, (2) equity, (3) adaptability, resilience, and robustness, (4)
accountability, and (5) conformance to general morality.
Furthermore, Imperial (1999) discusses how the IAD Framework
brings attention to three interrelated transaction costs that are
associated with interorganizational policy implementation and that
provide a suitable means for assessing an institutional arrangement
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at different points in time: information costs, coordination costs,
and strategic costs. Ostrom (2005) observes that changing to a
different institutional arrangement generally entails trade-offs
between different sets of evaluative criteria, where the relative
success of an arrangement will depend upon stated policy or other
objectives.
Fig. 3. The linkages among rules and levels of analysis. Adapted
from Ostrom (1990).
Enriching the framework
Despite its many strengths the IAD Framework, and commons
theory more generally, has been criticized for being both ahistorical
and apolitical (Agrawal and Yadama 1997, Mosse 1997, Agrawal
2002), giving too much precedence to rules and the way in which
rules operate to mould and constrain human behavior, while failing
to adequately account for power dynamics and context (Jentoft et
al. 1998, Ribot et al. 2006). McCay (2002) points out that although
commons theory does consider contextual variables such as group
size or resource complexity, a real appreciation of context must
extend beyond such variables to an awareness of what she calls
“situation.” According to McCay, accounting for the situations in
which people make decisions and undertake actions requires an
understanding of how rules and property rights emerge from within
particular historical, ecological, and cultural traditions. As such,
explaining how people relate to each other and to their environment
“requires specification of those situations and their broader
context” (McCay 2002:393), something the IAD Framework only
partially addresses. Furthermore, scholars employing the IAD
Framework generally posit that institutions emerge and develop as
the result of rational or boundedly rational decision makers whose
behavior relates to a set of incentives, and in so doing it they fail
to adequately consider the power dynamics at work in a system of
governance (Johnson 2004).  
Responding to these criticisms, Clement (2010) has proposed an
adapted version of the IAD Framework that considers the role of
power and the wider historical processes that come to bear on an
action situation. To do this, the new “politicized” IAD Framework
explicitly recognizes the need to consider discourse and the
influence of political and economic forces (Fig. 4). In so doing,
Clement has answered calls for more normative approaches to
understanding the commons to take advantage of critical methods
employed by those working in the field of political ecology (McCay
2002, Armitage 2008, Wilson 2010). Although Clement has
elaborated the rationale behind the revisions to the IAD
Framework elsewhere (Clement and Amezaga 2009, Clement
2010), we focus on how power and the wider context have been
incorporated into the IAD Framework by discussing the two
additional variables proposed by Clement: “discourse” and the
“political-economic” context. These variables affect both the
“action situation,” in particular the ways in which participants are
positioned, as well as the “actors” component of the action arena,
where they shape values, norms, and preferences (Clement 2010).
Fig. 4. The politicized IAD Framework, with the additional
variables shaded in grey. Adapted from Clement (2010).
Discourse
Discourse is a term that can be construed in many ways. In everyday
parlance the terms discourse and discussion are often considered
to be synonymous (Taylor 2001). When analyzing discourse,
however, the two terms must be distinguished from each other so
that the discussion (or debate) becomes the focus of analysis,
whereas discourse is understood to be a shared way of
apprehending the world that is embedded in language and that
“enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information
and put them together into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek
2005:9). Hajer and Versteeg (2005:175) define discourse as “an
ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning
is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced
and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices.” Thus
although an independent reality exists, we make sense of that reality
and attribute meaning to it through the use of particular discourses.
To this extent, discourse plays a fundamental role in the social
construction of the world we inhabit. Ontologically, this perspective
is associated with critical realism (Harré 1972, Bhaskar 1975) and
provides a philosophical bridge between the natural sciences and
more interpretive strands of the social sciences. 
The inclusion of discourse into the IAD Framework brings with it
a number of important developments. Of significance from an
institutional perspective is the consideration of power. Although
in the original IAD Framework Ostrom recognized power as a
relevant factor, she nonetheless does so in a highly instrumental
manner by taking the power of a participant in an action situation
to be the range of outcomes they are able to affect multiplied by
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the control they exercise over these outcomes (Ostrom 2005). A
far more dynamic conception of power can be found in the work
of the social philosopher Michel Foucault, who considered power,
knowledge, and discourse to be bound together. For Foucault,
power “is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a
certain strength we are endowed with; it is a name one attributes
to the complex strategical situation in a particular society”
(Foucault 1978:92). The power of social actors in this situation
is relational, in which the various positions and functions are
defined and negotiated through particular discourses (Hall 2001).
Hajer (1995:49) notes therefore that “in this view the power of
the institution is permanent in so far as it is a constant feature of
the discourses through which the role of that institution is being
reproduced.” Thus discourses and institutions are intrinsically
bound up in one another. Dryzek (2005:20) observes that certain
discourses become embodied in institutions, where they
“constitute the informal understandings that provide the context
for social interaction, on a par with formal institutional rules.”  
Also of interest to our discussion of discourse and the IAD
Framework is the notion of a “position.” In the framework’s
action situation all participants are assigned positions (Fig. 2), in
which the standing of a person in any given position relates to the
authorized actions available to them in this position or the way
in which the position they assume limits their actions. Positions
are conceived of as “anonymous slots” into which participants
can move, and may include judges, defendants, buyers, sellers,
resource users, regulators, and so on (Ostrom 2005:41). This
definition of a position is akin to what social psychologists have
traditionally termed a “role.” In critiquing the static and largely
formal concept of role as a way of understanding the self  in social
interactions, Davies and Harré (1990) have instead proposed that
people actively position themselves and those they are interacting
with in a situation by employing ideas, concepts, and categories
that derive from particular discourses or that relate to particular
storylines that actors draw upon in making sense of the world.
Thus positioning theory invokes a far more dynamic
understanding of social encounters in which people are involved
in an argumentative exchange, and identity is continually
negotiated as actors attempt to position themselves and others,
often subconsciously, in relation to a particular issue or set of
issues.
Political-economic context
The political-economic variable in the politicized IAD
Framework draws the analyst’s attention to contextual factors
that not only require one’s analysis to expand outward to take
account of the wider political and economic factors that directly
or indirectly influence the behavior of participants in the action
situation, but also to expand backward in time so as to understand
the events and processes that have given rise to present-day
conditions. As with discourse analysis, this approach resonates
strongly with the field of political ecology in which political-
economic analyses hold a central position. For these scholars, “a
focus on the respective roles and interactions of the state and the
market and the influence on environmental outcomes is critical”
(Neumann 2005:6). Without an understanding of both the local
and wider political and economic situation it is not possible to
appreciate the distribution of power among social actors, and
how such a power dynamic affects the behavior of individuals.
The consideration of political and economic factors also draws
attention to the issue of scale by acknowledging that “the design
and sound implementation of adequate rules at the local level is
significantly constrained by decisions made at higher governance
levels and by the structure of the economy” (Clement 2010:137).
According to Agrawal and Yadama (1997), explicit inclusion of
the political-economic context is a necessary addition to
mainstream commons research that has tended to focus on local
communities without regard for political and economic forces and
the ways in which they structure interactions within and between
groups and organizations.  
What’s more, despite the fact that institutional design is
historically contingent or “path dependent,” work on the
commons has tended to be remarkably ahistorical (Stern et al.
2002). However, appreciation of how the political-economic
context structures power dynamics in a system requires one to
consider not only present-day conditions but also the activity
leading up to them. Mosse (1997:470) has therefore argued that
historical analyses must be incorporated into standard models of
community resource management on the grounds that
“historically-specific structures of power, rather than simply
calculated pay-offs (or traditional wisdom) underlie the norms
and conventions of collective resource use, and account for the
occurrence and persistence of local institutions of resource use.
These do not only manage resources, they also serve to reproduce
relations of dominance and dependence, and provide the context
for political strategy and status competition.” 
In concluding then, although the original IAD Framework has
many strengths, not least of all its analytical clarity, applicability,
and capacity to account for nested levels of decision making, its
insights have failed to include critical approaches that recognize
that “the interplay of power, the positioning of various actors
within nested hierarchies and the role of context all exert a
powerful influence” (Armitage 2008:24). The two variables
Clement (2010) has included in the IAD Framework develop this
critical dimension by drawing attention to the significance of the
discursive and political-economic context in which individuals,
groups, and systems of resource governance are embedded and
in so doing bring an added awareness of “situation” to the
analysis, as argued for by McCay (2002). Before proceeding, it
must be noted that the IAD Framework has subsequently been
modified by Ostrom and her colleagues so as to develop a more
complex framework for analyzing social-ecological systems
(SES), where the emphasis has been on unpacking the
“biophysical” variable of the original IAD Framework (Ostrom
2007, 2011). Although this emerging SES Framework promises
much, we are instead interested only in the politicized IAD
Framework proposed by Clement (2010) because of its
applicability to analyses of (adaptive) comanagement.
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO (ADAPTIVE)
COMANAGEMENT
We discuss how the politicized IAD Framework is well suited to
“a systematic evaluation of [the comanagement] experience
grounded in commonly framed approaches” (Plummer and
Armitage 2007a:841). One of the great strengths of the framework
derives from its ability to bring all the relevant factors of a
situation to the attention of the analyst. Although not all of the
five exogenous variables previously discussed will necessarily
carry the same weight from one study to the next, the politicized
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IAD Framework nonetheless ensures that each is considered and
that those variables that play an important role in the behavior of
the situation under consideration are not overlooked. Similarly,
though the various components of the action situation (Fig. 2)
highlight the basic elements that must be incorporated into an
analysis of the interactions between actors in any situation, it can
also serve to guide an investigation into specific aspects of that
situation, such as the ability for certain individuals or groups to
participate in decision making, the ways in which actors position
themselves and others, the values they attribute to particular
outcomes that can be achieved, and so forth.  
In keeping with those writers who have argued that understanding
comanagement more fully will require the incorporation of both
normative and critical methods of analysis, we shall discuss how
the politicized IAD Framework can be used to analyze the various
dimensions of comanagement as outlined previously. Given the
methodological breadth on offer to users of the politicized IAD
Framework, the many interests of scholars working in the field
of comanagement, and the many different elements and
components that have come to be associated with the term itself
(see Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004, Plummer 2009), the intention
here is not to provide an exhaustive account of the ways in which
the framework can be employed to investigate comanagement.
Instead the discussion is intended to be suggestive; to point to the
relationship between the framework and comanagement while
demonstrating a logical progression someone attempting to
undertake a comprehensive comanagement study may wish to
follow. In Table 1 we provide a generalized account of the
relationship between comanagement and the politicized IAD
Framework.  
The first step an analyst takes when employing the politicized
IAD Framework is to define the action situation (Fig. 2). In
considering comanagement, one may be interested in such
instances as a government organization and a community of
resource users, a geographical area, or a particular resource. Given
Carlsson and Berkes’ (2005) argument that comanagement should
be studied in terms of function and process, we follow them in
suggesting a good option for defining the action situation is to
start with the management activities associated with the resource
in question and the actors whose job it is to carry them out. In
doing so it may be useful to consider the seven broad management
activities comanagement can enhance, as outlined by Pinkerton
(1989b:6). Thus although the resource, be it a region of forest or
a river corridor, is geographically located, the action situation may
include actors located outside of the resource boundary if  their
decisions affect the management of that resource (Imperial 1999).  
Defining the action situation according to management activities,
or function, emphasizes the importance of scale by bringing
attention to the organizational levels across which management
decisions are located. This is significant to analyses of
comanagement because of its focus on cross-scale interplay
(Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, Carlsson and Berkes 2005, Berkes
2009), and where it has been recognized that “the connections
between governmental and nongovernmental actors themselves
are ripe for examination using IAD” (Blomquist and DeLeon
2011:5). Furthermore, by ascertaining who the relevant actors
involved in a given management activity are, and the relationship
of these actors to one another in the action situation, the
framework allows the researcher to develop a network approach
to analyzing process and function, a line of enquiry that is
currently receiving much attention and that serves to promote an
understanding of “comanagement as governance” (Carlsson and
Berkes 2005, Newman and Dale 2005, Bodin et al. 2006, Janssen
et al. 2006). The politicized IAD Framework can then be used to
critically analyze the connections and interactions within these
networks and the outcomes that occur as a result, including
processes of problem solving, social learning, power sharing, and
the development of trust and newly devised rules-in-use. The
framework can also be used to investigate how a particular
network “is embedded in a system of political economy, and
embedded in greater cultural or normative systems” (Brown
2001:2, as cited in Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2007). In the end,
whichever way the action situation is defined, what is important
is to appreciate that in many respects comanagement is concerned
with the participation of actors at the collective-choice level
(Pinkerton 2003) because this is where management decisions take
place (Ostrom 1990, Schlager and Ostrom 1992).  
Having decided upon the action situation, a general strategy is
then to identify which aspects of the biophysical, political-
economic, discursive, institutional, and community setting
influence the various elements of the action situation as detailed
in Figure 2. In effect, how do the exogenous variables affect who
is allowed to participate in the situation, what actions they can
take and the costs associated with them, what outcomes they can
affect, how actions are linked to outcomes, what information they
have access to, and the extent to which they have control over
outcomes they can affect (Ostrom 1990). To do this, one may first
wish to enquire into the biophysical conditions by considering the
characteristics of the resource. Here commons scholars have
identified particular resource attributes, such as complexity, size,
and productivity that affect the likelihood that resource users will
self-organize (Ostrom 1999b, 2009). Self-organization is also a
concept that is considered important in both resilience thinking,
where the focus is on how systems reorganize in the face of change,
and political ecology, where the interest is in understanding how
environmental systems can form or shape self-organizing, self-
sustaining power relationships (Armitage 2008). Furthermore,
self-organization may connote institution building as rules are
crafted to structure new forms of collective action between
participants (Pinkerton 1999, Hodgson 2006). Another
important aspect of the biophysical conditions relates to the
presence of technology in the system of interest. For example,
Pahl-Wostl et al. (2007) observe that large, centrally designed
infrastructure is indicative of single sources of design, power, and
delivery, that is, system attributes that characterize a command-
and-control approach to resource governance. Alternatively,
technology on an appropriate scale is typical of diverse sources
of design, power, and delivery and may therefore represent a
system that is better primed for more pluralistic forms of decision
making such as comanagement.  
Analysis of the political-economic context reveals ways in which
power is distributed among the actors in a management
arrangement and provides a critical appreciation of the potential
for concepts such as trust or power sharing to emerge and develop.
For example, in questioning the fact that “virtually every co-
management case study encountered in the literature [on the
circumpolar North] is a success story,” Nadasdy (2003a:368)
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Table 1. Relationship between the politicised IAD Framework and (adaptive) comanagement.
 Exogenous Variable Description of Variable Relationship of Variable to (Adaptive) Comanagement
Biophysical and
Material
Ecosystem conditions, resource attributes, and
forms of technology. In the action situation
this variable affects what actions are possible,
what outcomes can be produced, and what is
contained in the actors’ information sets.
Environmental feedback caused by changes in ecosystem or resource dynamics
can trigger collective action, where certain properties of the resource and the
presence of technology are known to affect the ability of actors to self-organize.
Particular forms of infrastructure, e.g., large and centralized or decentralized on
an appropriate scale, are also indicative of the type of governance arrangement,
e.g., top-down or polycentric, and thus the potential for comanagement to
emerge.
Political-economic A contextual variable concerned with the
overall political economy of the system in
which the action situation is embedded. In
particular this variable positions participants
in the action situation, and shapes their
values, norms, and preferences. It strongly
influences the distribution of power between
stakeholders.
Comanagement networks are embedded in the wider political economy, which
shapes power relations, structures cross-scale interplay and network
characteristics, and influences the forms of power sharing, trust building, and
rule crafting that emerge. These attributes in turn affect processes of problem
solving and social learning. The structural influences of the political economy
do not affect local environmental conditions directly but are mediated through
the institutions and organizational characteristics of the comanagement
arrangement in question. The political economy is a “slow variable” that
strongly shapes overall system trajectory.
Discourses Gives meaning to the physical and social
world, and can be used to sustain or challenge
existing power structures. In particular this
variable positions participants in the action
situation, and shapes their values, norms, and
preferences.
Environmental crises, which often serve as a trigger for comanagement, are not
an objectively definable state of the world but instead are constructed and
negotiated by stakeholders through the use of particular discourses. Discourses
also operate to sustain or challenge power relations between participants as
certain discourses become normalized or are undermined, and by positioning
the actors in the action situation according to particular storylines. They are
also vital for developing and maintaining the institutions that enhance
collaborative and learning-based approaches. Discourses therefore provide a
critical approach to understanding power-sharing arrangements between
participants in the comanagement process.
Rules-in-use The set of rules “to which participants would
make reference if  asked to justify and explain
their actions to fellow participants” (Ostrom
2005:19). Rules-in-use both enable and
constrain human behavior by stating what
actions are required, permitted, or forbidden.
They affect all elements in the action
situation.
Rules can operate to make a system of resource governance rigid and vulnerable
to change, or flexible and dynamic by facilitating communication, negotiation,
conflict resolution, problem solving, and joint learning within and between
scales of organization. Enabling legislation at higher levels can encourage self-
organization and the process of adaptive comanagement, while locally devised
rules can enhance social learning, tighten environmental feedback loops, and
increase the adaptive capacity of resource users. Rule changing allows
participants to alter a system’s trajectory and to institutionalize social memory.
Attributes of
Community
Physical attributes of the community, such as
the number of participants, and their gender,
race, and age. Cultural attributes, including
the systems of norms, values, and beliefs that
structure the participants’ understanding of
the world.
Physical attributes of the community affect the ability of stakeholders to self-
organize; for example, the size of a group alters stakeholders’ incentives to act
collectively, and differences in race and gender may affect power relations and
levels of trust between participants. Particular functions of individuals,
including acting as leaders, knowledge carriers, or networkers, are known to
affect the process of adaptive comanagement. Furthermore, cultural differences
or similarities can greatly influence the ability of a comanagement arrangement
to emerge by undermining or enhancing trust and social capital, and the ability
of participants to communicate, jointly learn about, and act in response to
changes in social or environmental circumstances. This variable also allows the
analyst to explore the relationship between comanagement networks and the
larger cultural systems in which they are embedded.
critically examines the case of a comanagement sheep-steering
committee in southwest Yukon and shows that despite the fact
that this particular case has been branded a model of success by
many, the indigenous Kluane First Nation members and some of
the biologists on the comanagement committee considered the
process to be a “complete failure.” Nadasdy demonstrates that
although there are a number of contributing factors that led to
this outcome, the roots of the problem are in fact political and in
the end the comanagement process only served to reinforce
existing power imbalances between the various parties. In a
separate analysis on forest use in the Kumaon Himalaya in India,
Agrawal and Yadama (1997) argue that socioeconomic forces can
significantly influence the condition of renewable resources and
the ways in which these resources are managed. However, the
authors discuss how such forces are always mediated by local
institutions; findings that they conclude have significant
implications for the role of comanagement between the market,
state, and the community. Adger et al. (2006) also highlight the
importance of considering the political-economic variable in the
politicized IAD Framework through a discussion of how the
structure of the political economy, which reflects the distribution
of power between stakeholders, strongly influences cross-scale
interactions in comanagement networks. Here “cross-scale
interactions by powerful stakeholders have the potential to
undermine trust in resource management arrangements,” where
“the structure of cross-scale interplay, in terms of relative winners
and losers, determines its contribution to the resilience of social-
ecological systems” (Adger et al. 2006:9).  
Understanding political and economic events and how they have
come to structure the action situation draws attention to the
evolutionary nature of the process. Graham and Ernstson (2012)
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show how an historical analysis of a comanagement agreement
in Macassar Dunes, Cape Town, reveals that the political
approach that characterized decision making prior to the
introduction of the comanagement arrangement tended to be top
down and exclusionary. The authors conclude that “the formative
stages of the co-management process represent a fundamental
co-management barrier for some interviewees, and have
implications in the contemporary setting for who should now
‘take responsibility.’” Thus an historical account of political and
economic drivers provides an insight into the factors that have
come to determine the current system trajectory as well as those
factors that may constrain or enable the pathway it takes in the
future. Here again then, a critical perspective unearths contextual
details pertaining to core concepts in resilience thinking and
adaptive comanagement, in this case “system trajectory” and
“pathways of change,” therefore grounding abstract theoretical
constructs within the specifics of a particular study.  
Discourse analysis offers up many fruitful avenues of enquiry for
the study of comanagement. For example, Degnbol (2003) draws
attention to the gap between mainstream discourses in fisheries
science and the discourses of local users. He argues that if
comanagement arrangements are to become truly inclusive this
gap must be bridged. It is therefore of interest to the researcher
to understand the different ways in which users and government
officials talk about the resource system in question, including its
use and its management. Alternatively, examining the ways in
which the various actors in the comanagement process talk about
each other can also provide valuable insights into issues such as
trust, power sharing, problem solving, and social learning. In
discussing an agreement to comanage shellfish in the Dutch
Wadden Sea, Steins (1999:139) reveals how the imagery
participants draw upon in describing the character and activity
of the other actors in the agreement has tended to “cloud the
discussions over resource use in the negotiating and decision-
making process at the collective-choice and constitutional level.”  
Discourse analysis therefore provides a means of understanding
how participants in a comanagement arrangement draw upon
particular discourses and storylines to position themselves and
others in relation to the challenge of resource management, and
the developments that occur as these positions are negotiated and
renegotiated over time. An inherent feature of such analyses are
the power dynamics operating within and across nested scales of
organization, be it relating to the link between humans and their
environment or between networks of actors in a collaborative
setting. Therefore although power sharing is often portrayed as
an outcome in the literature, the framework also highlights how
the balance of power between participants in the action situation
intrinsically influences their behavior and the sorts of outcomes
that can be achieved, including the degree to which an equitable
power-sharing arrangement may feasibly be reached.
Furthermore, understanding how an environmental issue
becomes a crisis through the meanings attributed to it by social
actors is also important because a precondition for
comanagement is the recognition of a crisis of some sort
(Pinkerton 1989b, Selin and Chavez 1995, Plummer and
Fitzgibbon 2004). The point at which an environmental issue is
deemed to be a crisis is not an objectively defined state of the
world but instead emerges as a result of the ways in which the
problem is discursively constructed and particular storylines are
employed to make sense of the many competing discourses
different actors bring to the issue, be they government officials,
scientists, resource users, citizens, or whoever (Hajer 1995).  
Analysis of the rules-in-use provides an understanding of the
incentives an individual or group face in a given action situation.
Actors make decisions within a system of rules and appreciating
how such rules constrain or enable a comanagement arrangement
is therefore of much importance to the analyst, where changes in
the rules toward a more inclusive system of governance reflects a
process of institution building for comanagement (Pomeroy and
Berkes 1997). Such changes may take the form of wider enabling
legislation that recognizes a community of resource users as
legitimate participants in particular arenas of management
decision making and that is known to encourage self-organization
and the emergence of adaptive comanagement (Olsson et al.
2004a), or alternatively rules might be crafted that aim to facilitate
collective action between resource users at the local level or
between local institutions and government bodies (Ostrom 1990,
1999b). In their process-oriented model of comanagement,
Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2000) discuss how before entering a
learning-by-doing phase, rules must be devised that allow
participants to enter into negotiation and discussion with one
another. Identifying barriers or opportunities to rule changes such
as these requires an understanding of the system’s trajectory and
the power dynamics at play, which comes about through a critical
analysis of the political-economic and discursive landscape.  
The final variable available to the analyst relates to the community
within which the action situation is located. In many ways this
variable represents the cultural dimension of the analysis, and can
prove an especially significant feature of attempts to comanage a
resource because in many cases comanagement arrangements
have emerged from the coming together of disparate cultural
perspectives. Sometimes the difference may lie between the
organizational culture of a bureaucratic government
administration whose guiding principles are predicated upon a
rational scientific tradition and the indigenous value-system of a
community of resource users (Castro and Nielsen 2001, Nadasdy
2003b). At other times the differences may be less pronounced but
perhaps still challenging if  the political culture in the country
reflects a tradition of nonparticipation from citizens, leans heavily
toward a different form of governance such as market rationalism,
or favors some kinds of comanagement arrangements over others
(Sen and Nielsen 1996). Ostrom (2005:27) makes clear the
importance of considering the cultural aspect of the
comanagement process when she states that “if  the participants
in a situation come from many different cultures, speak different
languages, and are distrustful of one another, the costs of devising
and sustaining effective rules are substantially increased.”
However, the variable “community” need not refer only to a
consideration of culture but may relate to other attributes, such
as the size and composition of a community of resource users,
the race, gender, and age of participants, or the degree of
inequality in the distribution of basic assets among the
participants (Ostrom 2005). From an adaptive comanagement
perspective, the analyst may also benefit from thinking about the
key functions that participants perform in the action situation,
where these functions include leaders, followers, knowledge
carriers, networkers, innovators, interpreters, and entrepreneurs,
and how the prevalence, distribution, and relationship between
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the various individuals performing such functions affects the
development of the comanagement process (Folke et al. 2005,
Berkes 2009, Plummer 2009).  
Thus each variable associated with the politicized IAD
Framework in turn relates to a suite of questions that are of
relevance to the study of comanagement. What variables and
which questions emerge as the focus of any given study will depend
upon their relevance to the case under consideration and the
interests of the researcher. However, by bringing attention to all
the relevant exogenous variables that affect an action situation
and the components that comprise it, the framework ensures that
an analyst identifies those aspects of the situation that are most
relevant to the objectives of their study and ensures that no critical
element is overlooked. Furthermore, the framework is also well
placed to structure cross-disciplinary team studies, in which the
analytical clarity it provides can be used to guide and organize
the work threads of the various members in the team. Having
conducted the analysis, the researcher may be in a position to
make predictions as to the outcomes of the comanagement
process. However, given the large degree of uncertainty and
procedural openness usually associated with comanagement, it is
unlikely that any attempt at making predictions can move beyond
informed estimations of what is more or less likely to occur in a
particular situation, or a general appreciation of what the
consequences of changing the rules would be (Ostrom 2005). 
Alternatively, the analyst may wish to evaluate the outcomes that
have transpired as a result of the comanagement process. As
discussed previously, transaction-cost analysis provides a means
of evaluating the performance of an interorganizational network
at different junctures in time, by considering information costs,
coordination costs, and strategic costs (Imperial 1999). The
advantage of this kind of assessment is that no bias exists
concerning the appropriate form of governance for a given
situation. Thus it may be that comanagement proves to be
inappropriate or that another governance arrangement is better
suited to the particulars of the case. Furthermore, when crafting
a new institutional arrangement, it may be common for one set
of transaction costs to decrease and another to rise. For example,
in the early stages of the comanagement process one may observe
an increase in coordination costs as a greater number of
participants become involved in decision making and new
procedures to which they are not accustomed. However, over time,
information costs may decrease as levels of communication
improve, decision making becomes routine, and information
asymmetries between the various actors become less pronounced.
Thus transaction costs can be divided up according to whether
they are long-term or short-term by nature (Carlsson and Berkes
2005).  
Beyond the analysis of transaction costs, one may also wish to
evaluate the overall performance of the system after a sustained
period of time. Although many evaluative criteria are compatible
with the politicized IAD Framework, some are more relevant to
comanagement than others. For example, improving equity has
always been one of the central premises for implementing
comanagement (Pinkerton 1989a, Ingles et al. 1999, Plummer and
Fitzgibbon 2004). Here a distinction must be made between equity
relating to (1) the proportionality between what an individual
pays and the benefits they receive (fiscal equivalence), and (2) a
system based on an individual’s ability to pay (redistributional
equity; Ostrom 2005), where the relative weight placed on either
of these two forms of equity will be case specific. With the
adaptive turn in comanagement, attention must also be given to
the resilience of the system. Ostrom (2005:67) raises such
questions as “do individuals learn from experience within an
action situation?” and “Do they adapt to new circumstances as
they arise or do they become rigid in their response over time?”
More recently, Plummer and Armitage (2007b) have proposed a
comprehensive resilience-based framework for evaluating
adaptive comanagement, in which they have developed scale-
specific parameters for three broad categories of assessment
criteria: ecosystem conditions, livelihood outcomes, and process
and institutional conditions. The framework they provide emerges
from a complex adaptive systems perspective and offers a
systematic means for assessing adaptive comanagement in
accordance with the various elements that have come to define it.  
In summary, this discussion has demonstrated that the politicized
IAD Framework is a useful tool for guiding analyses and
evaluations of (adaptive) comanagement according to an
integrated methodological approach. By referring to particular
examples from the literature, we have shown how the five
exogenous variables of the framework draw attention to the
various faces of comanagement as outlined by Berkes (2007, 2009)
and emerging concepts from resilience thinking and political
ecology such as scale, self-organization, path dependence, and
system trajectory (Olsson et al. 2004b, Folke et al. 2005, Neumann
2005). At the same time, the variables permit the analyst to ground
these concepts in a critical awareness of “situation” (McCay
2002). Furthermore, by considering rules-in-use, aspects of the
political-economic context, and evaluative criteria such as
transaction costs and efficiency, the politicized IAD Framework
remains relevant to policy makers through the identification of
the socioeconomic the institutional components of an action
situation. Thus the framework overcomes perceived weaknesses
of approaches in political ecology that have been criticized for
failing to produce useful policy recommendations (Neumann
2005), an issue that has also been recognized as a challenge for
adaptive comanagement scholars (Armitage et al. 2007).
CONCLUSION
We have proposed that Clement’s (2010) “politicized” version of
the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework
is well suited to the study of (adaptive) comanagement. In doing
so we have answered calls from scholars to develop or adopt a
common framework that facilitates a systematic study of
comanagement across different settings and that is able to ground
the normative concepts associated with the subject in critical
approaches that recognize context and the power dynamics at play
in a system of resource governance. Over the last three decades
comanagement theory has come to be seen in a number of
different ways. The general tendency has been to move from a
perspective that views comanagement in terms of a formal power-
sharing arrangement between a homogenous government and a
community of resource users, to a focus on function, process, and
the appreciation that social-ecological systems are complex,
adaptive, and characterized by an inherent degree of uncertainty.
Thus comanagement has “many faces” and can be thought of in
terms of power sharing, institution building, trust building,
process, problem solving, social learning, and governance (Berkes
2007, 2009, Plummer and Armitage 2007a). 
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We have shown how the politicized IAD Framework is an
appropriate tool for guiding an analysis of the many faces of
comanagement by drawing attention to the various dimensions
of the process and the sorts of questions that arise when
considering them. The framework is also unbiased in that it does
not favor one form of governance, such as comanagement, over
another but instead evaluates each situation on its own merits
(Imperial 1999). Thus the framework serves as a point of cross-
pollination between the field of comanagement and scholars
working in other areas of environmental governance by providing
a consistent means of analyzing and evaluating the many
institutional arrangements that exist across differing geographical
and social contexts. At the same time, the politicized IAD
Framework provides the specificity and structure needed to
conduct a comprehensive analysis of comanagement, one that
critically assesses the potential for normative concepts such as
power sharing, trust, and social learning to emerge from within
the biophysical, political-economic, discursive, institutional, and
cultural milieu of a particular study. Such analyses provide a solid
foundation upon which to make sound policy recommendations.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6177
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